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STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR REHEARING 
The Appellant now petitions this Court for a rehearing in this 
case pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In affirming the Summary Judgment decisions of the trial court 
dated June 15, 1989, July 20, 1989, and August 10, 1989, the Court 
of Appeals misapprehended the application of the law as it applies 
to the present case, and misapplied Rule 31 of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals as it applies to this case in its Order dated 
June 5, 1990. Moreover, the Appellant believes that in reaching 
this conclusion, the Appellate Court erred in its application of 
the established legal precedents to the facts presented in the 
record on appeal, and the amended correct record on appeal. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPELLANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING 
I. Does a tenant have a counterclaim right against the 
landlord for locking the rent paid storage unit doors 
for a period of time in excess of five (5) months? 
And were the counterclaim rights denied in violation 
of the law? 
II. Does a conflicting, unsigned, and unfiled, Deposition 
supplanted by the Attorney's canned Affidavit, for the 
same witness, for the same day, at the same time, and 
notarized by himself, constitute an act of fraud, when 
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relied upon and utilized to obtain a Summary Judgment? 
III. Is a Tenant/ or any of his family members, entitled 
to any Exempt Property? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THE APPELLANT'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING AS FOLLOWS: 
United States Constitution 14th Amendment 
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-2 
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-3(1) 
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-3(2) 
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-3(3) 
Utah Judicial Code Section 78-23-0 
Utah Judicial Code Section 78-36-2(1) 
Utah Judicial Code Section 78-36-8.5 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 3.4.(b) 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 8.4.(c) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13 
SDMMARV OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A tenant does have a counterclaim right against the landlord 
for locking the rent paid storage unit doors, and the counterclaim 
rights denied were in violation of the law; a conflicting unsigned, 
unfiled, Deposition supplanted by the Attorney's canned Affidavit, 
for the same witness, for the same day, at the same time, and 
notarized by himself, constitutes an act of fraud, when relied upon 
and utilized to obtain a Summary Judgment. The tenant and his 
family are entitled to all exempt property. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I 
A TENANT DOES HAVE A COUNTERCLAIM RIGHT AGAINST THE LANDLORD 
FOR LOCKING THE RENT PAID STORAGE UNIT DOORS FOR A PERIOD OF TIME 
IN EXCESS OF FIVE (5) MONTHS AND THE COUNTERCLAIM RIGHTS DENIED 
WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW. 
There is no question that the Respondent-landlord locked the 
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Appellant-tenant rent-paid storage unit doors, for in excess of 
five (5) months, (R at 56 par. 14 and 23). 
The Respondent's claim for locking the rent-paid storage unit 
doors sounds of fraud, discussed in ISSUE II of this Petition For 
Rehearing. However, the Respondents claims do not comport with 
law and will not be discussed in this issue. 
The foundation of renting any facility from a landlord is the 
implied covenant that the tenant can come and go as he pleases, 
having undisturbed access so long as the tenant does not damage the 
property, create garbage, interfere with other tenants, and the 
rent it paid on time. 
In this case, the rent was paid on time (App-4 and 7), but to 
no avail, because the landlord did not abide by his own implied 
covenant to undisturbed access discussed in the Appellant's Brief 
pages 29 through 34. Moreover, this is a violation of the Utah 
Judicial Code 78-36-2(1),(APP-31A) which states: 
"Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer 
who . . . (1) by force, or by menaces and 
threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps 
the possession of any real property, whether the 
same was acquired peaceable or otherwise . . .M 
The Respondent, is not immune or exempted in anyway from the 
unlawful locking of the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, 
discussed in the Appellant's Reply Brief pages 11 and 12. 
Consequently, the Appellant is entitled to an appropriate 
counterclaim pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 
No. 13 (R at 69). 
The Trial Court Minute Entries dated June 15, 1989, (APP-45) 
and July 20, 1989, (APP-46) denied the counterclaim right. The 
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Court of Appeals denied the counterclaim rights in each of three 
occasions: 
A. Order denying Extraordinary Writ—Case No. 
890455-CA, dated July 25, 1989, (R.B. page 26)-
-despite a similar ruling in White v. District 
Court of Utah County 232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951). 
B. Order denying Motions, Case No. 890461-CA, dated 
August 1, 1989, (R.B. page 27). 
C. Order Summary Judgment affirmance, Case No. 
890461-CA, dated June 5, 1990. 
This is a violation of each of the following: 
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13. 
B. U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment, equal 
protection of the laws. 
In summary, the U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment (equal 
protection of the laws), the statute (forcible detainer) the rules 
(U.R.C.P. No. 13 counterclaim) and the case law (White v. District 
Court of Utah County) all gives rise to the Appellant's 
counterclaim rights. Why have the Appellant's counterclaim rights 
been dilatorily and repeatedly denied? 
In short, the Appellant is entitled to the counterclaim 
rights, which include a trial asserting damages for trover and 
conversion, for both his business property earnings; the amending 
of the Appellant's Counterclaim Complaint for the property 
maliciously sold by the Respondent—in violation of the Appellant's 
PROPERTY BOND (APP-40, 40A), tendered and signed by the Respondent 
(App-1) July 21, 1989, prior to the fraudulent, unlawful disposal 
of his, his spouses, and his children's property July 25, 1989. 
This court must grant the Appellant's counterclaim rights as a 
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matter of law under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13 
and the U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment equal protection of the 
laws, and due process of the law, (APP-32A). 
ISSUE II 
A CONFLICTING UNSIGNED, UNFILED, DEPOSITION SUPPLANTED BY THE 
ATTORNEY'S CANNED AFFIDAVIT, FOR THE SAME WITNESS, FOR THE SAME 
DAY, AT THE SAME TIME, AND NOTARIZED BY HIMSELF, CONSTITUTES AN ACT 
OF FRAUD, WHEN RELIED UPON AND UTILIZED TO OBTAIN A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The facts of this issue can be reviewed from the record the 
Respondent (R at 56 par. 13.), the Appellant (R at 55), the 
Respondent (R at 53 on page 2), note specifically: 
"Since the affidavit was prepared before the deposition 
by Plaintiff's counsel, it is only natural that some 
minor changes necessary to make it comport with the 
deposition may have been omitted." 
Moreover, the Appellant contests (R at 54 paragraph 3): 
" . . . demands that the Plaintiff explain the 
purpose of the Deposition if the canned 
Affidavit was waiting for Ms. Audrey Hooper's 
signature in purporting, 'I explained to him on 
several occasions that it was a mistake, that 
there was no reduction in rent and never had 
been, and that he owed the full $40 per unit per 
month. On each of these occasions, the 
explanation was made in writing, a copy of one 
of which is attached hereto.'" 
Now, please review the Appellant's objections (R at 50 par. Nos. 
4, 5, 14, 15, and 16) and the Respondent's assertions filed with 
the trial court after the minute entry dated June 15, 1989, (R at 
46 page 2, par. 4). The trial court ignored knowledge (R at 44 
par. 7), (R at 45 par. 4) and the Trial Court's reliance upon the 
Respondent's assertion (R at 41 par. 4) and the Court of Appeals' 
ignorance of the Appellant's Reply Brief Issue Nos. I and II which 
deserves more than the curt judicial whisk conveyed in its Court 
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Order dated June 5, 1990. 
There is no question that the Respondent's legal council knew 
that his previously prepared canned Affidavit was false, when 
completing the scheduled Deposition on April 29, 1989. 
Nevertheless, he escorted his patsy, duped-witness into another 
room with the door ajar whereby he instructed his patsy, duped-
witness to sign the canned Affidavit (APP-5, 5A), just moments 
after attesting to controverting facts, in the scheduled 
Deposition, described in the Appellant's Reply Brief pages 1 
through 7. The Attorney's intention and his hope was that of 
obtaining a Summary Judgment for his client by asserting 
reformation of the contract, the Respondent's claim of a mistake 
to a previous rent-rate in violation of the contractual 
notification requirements, by asserting DEFAULT in attempting to 
justify the locking of the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit 
doors. And finally, in providing evidence that the court would 
believe that there existed a DEFAULT so that he—the Attorney— 
could get paid by the Appellant for his services rendered, instead 
of by his client. Perhaps his client believed that it would be 
cheaper to claim default, mistake and require the Appellant to pay 
contract reformation and moving expenses, rather than for the 
Respondent to pay moving expenses when retaliatorily expelling the 
Appellant from the properly rented facilities by force, fraud, and 
now wrongful eviction. This, in my opinion, is a violation of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule Nos. 3.4.(b) (App-35) and 
8.4.(c) (App-37). Many an attorney has been disbarred for similar 
actions, and Mr. Lynn P. Heward should be no exception. Some 
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relevant cases in point which should apply to the case at bar are 
as follows: 
MThe use of evidence by an attorney on behalf 
of his client, in a court proceeding, of an 
account known by him to be fabricated, is a 
violation of the attorney's oath of office and 
is grounds for disbarment.11 
RE Ernest H. O'Brien, 14 ALR 859 (1921). 
MAccordinglyf disciplinary action will lie 
against an attorney for inducing a witness to 
testify falsely," 
7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law /43 Pages 97, 98, and 99. 
Hence, the Affidavits of both Ms. Audrey Hooper, (APP-5, 5A) 
and Mr. Steven J. Nelson (APP-14, 14A) add nothing to this case 
because each reeks of conspiracy and fraud—all manipulated and 
controlled by, in my opinion, their crafty Attorney, Mr. Lynn P. 
Heward, in attempting to prove rent-rates in violation of the 
contractual notification requirements, in attempting to prove 
statutory duties of responsibility, in violation of the statutory 
prerequisites to enforcement, which were utilized in violation of 
the contractual termination and default provisions of the Rental 
Agreement. Consequently, by fraudulent means the Respondent has 
asserted and obtained enforcement of Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Section 38-8-3 (R.B. page 8) without the proper 
compliance with Utah Code of Judicial Administration Sections 38-
8-2, 38-8-3(2), and 38-8-3(3), (R.B. page 8, 9). Therefore, this 
tenant, his spouse, and his children have been stripped of all 
their personal possessions accumulated in various parts of the 
world through inheritance, hard work, and careful planning. Where 
is the equal protection of the laws set forth in the U.S. 
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Constitution 14th Amendment? (App-32A) 
ISSOE III 
THE TENANT AND EACH MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY ARE ENTITLED TO ALL 
EXEMPT PROPERTY. 
A careful review of the uncontroverted facts Appellant's Brief 
pages 34 through 46 renders the appropriate exempt property claims 
that should be honored and enforced by this Court, 
The Respondent has argued pages 23 through 27 of his Brief 
that the Appellant waited nearly four months after the sale to 
claim exempt property, therefore no claim should be allowed. 
The Appellant must argue that the Respondent's asserted claim 
of n default for the rent-paid storage units for the first period 
of time May 1988 through September 1988, and for the second period 
of time October 1988 through December 1988, should be denied since 
the Respondent waited until January 20, 1989, more than eight 
months later for the first period of time, and nearly four months 
later for the second period of time to make his asserted claim of 
default. Therefore, no asserted claim of default should be 
allowed. 
The Appellant finds the Respondent's illogic and subterfuge 
of an excuse in violation of the Appellant's tendered and 
Respondent signed PROPERTY BOND, Utah Judicial Code 78-36-8.5 (App-
40, 40A) and (App-1), the U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment Section 
1 (App-32A)—MNor shall any state (Utah) deprive any person . . . 
[of] property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
If these are more than just words with full force and effect, 
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then the force must come from this court. Please do that now! 
CONCLOSION 
There is no question that the Appellant is entitled to an 
appropriate counterclaim. There is no question that the 
supplanting by the Attorney of the canned Affidavit for the same 
witness, for the same day, at the same time, and notarized by 
himself, constitutes an act of fraud when relied upon and utilized 
to obtain a Summary Judgment, and finally, there is no question 
that the tenant and all of his family members are entitled to all 
exempt property, undamaged or full payment restitution immediately. 
Therefore, this case should be reversed and remanded for trial 
since the established legal precedents to the facts presented in 
the record on appeal, and the amended correct record on appeal 
requires that this Court remand the matter back to the trial court 
for an analysis of the issues of material facts set forth and 
uncontroverted in this Appeal. 
The Appellant, William L. Echols, hereby certifies that this 
Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
Dated this IS day of \j^lH<L^ , 1990. 
Respectfully Submitted 
William L. Echols, Pro-Se 
Defendant and Appellant 
733 North 800 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801) 377-0705 
-9-
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Petition For Rehearing was hand delivered to Lynn P, 
Heward #1479, Attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 923 East 
5375 South #E, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, on this /J>*— 
day of \J UH^ , 1990. The sum of three copies, as 
agreed. 
William L. Echols, Pro-Se 
Defendant and Appellant 
io^k~ &? ^ 4 
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38-8-2 LIENS 
occupants who are to have access to the facility for the purpose of storing 
and removing personal property. No occupant may use a self-service stor-
age facility for residential purposes. The owner of a self-service storage 
facility is not a warehouseman as used in Subsection 70A-7-102(l)(h). If 
an owner issues any warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other document 
of title for the personal property stored, the owner and the occupant are 
subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the provi-
sions of this chapter do not apply. 
History: C. 1953, 38-8-1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 171, § 1. 
38-8-2. Lien against stored property — Attachment and 
duration — Search for financing statement pre-
requisite to enforcement of lien. 
Where a rental agreement, as defined in Subsection 38-8-1(6), is entered 
into between the owner and the occupant, the owner of the self-service storage 
facility and his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns have 
a lien upon all personal property located at the self-service storage facility for 
rent, labor, or other charges, present or future, in relation to the personal 
property and for expenses necessary for its preservation or expenses reason-
ably incurred in its sale or other disposition under this chapter. The lien 
attaches as of the date the personal property is brought to the self-service 
storage facility and continues so long as the owner retains possession and 
until any default is corrected, or a sale pursuant to a default is conducted, or 
the property is otherwise disposed of to satisfy the lien. Before taking enforce-
ment action under Section 38-8-3, the owner shall determine if a financing 
statement filed in accordance with Section 70A-9-401, et seq. has been filed 
with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code concerning the prop-
erty to be sold or otherwise disposed of. 
History: C. 1953, 38-8-2, enacted by L. rations and Commercial Code" for "in the office 
1981, ch. 171, § 2; L. 1984, ch. 66, § 163. of the lieutenant governor" in the last sen-
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amend- tence; and made minor changes in style, 
ment substituted "with the Division of Corpo-
38-8-3. Enforcement of lien — Notice requirements — Sale 
procedure and effect. 
A claim of an owner which has become due against an occupant and which 
is secured by the owner's lien may be satisfied as follows: 
(1) No enforcement action may be taken by the owner until the occu-
pant has been in default continuously for a period of 30 days. 
(2) After the occupant has been in default continuously for a period of 
30 days, the owner may begin enforcement action if the occupant has been 
given notice in writing. The notice shall be delivered in person or sent by 
certified mail to the last known address of the occupant, and a copy of the 
notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the sheriff of the county where 
the self-service storage facility is located. Any lienholder with an interest 
in the property to be sold or otherwise disposed of, of whom the owner has 
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Rule 13 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah (Utah 1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694 
377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Town of P.2d 612 (Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Constr. 
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
(1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d Ct. App. 1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 
57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 
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 2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Rothey v. 
924 (1968); Lewis v. Porter, 548 P.2d 496 (Utah
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 38, federal courts on motion for summary judg-
43 to 45; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et ment or for judgment on the pleadings, 1 
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237, A.L.R. Fed. 295. 
280, 389 et seq. What, other than affidavits, constitutes 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136, "matters outside the pleadings," which may 
138, 143, 144, 162 et seq., 173; 27 C.J.S. Dis- convert motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
missal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 C.J.S. Pleading Procedure 12(b), (c) into motion for summary 
§§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116, 121 to 129, 264 to judgment, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 1027. 
268, 424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or 
586. 13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with 
A.L.R. — Right to voluntary dismissal of jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as 
civil action as affected by opponent's motion for waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388. 
summary judgment, judgment on the plead- Key Numbers. — Dismissal and Nonsuit «=» 
ings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 67; Pleading «=» 76 et seq., 85, 89 to 95, 218 to 
Necessity of hearing and oral argument in 226, 342 to 350, 361 to 364, 367, 404 to 413. 
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against 
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adju-
dication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action 
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the 
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by 
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on 
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 
13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or 
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may 
claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the 
pleading of the opposing party. . 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which 
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, 
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supple-
mental pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
40 
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(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim 
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a 
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of 
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party 
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or 
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties 
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete 
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall 
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if juris-
diction of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may 
be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of 
the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross 
demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one 
had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set 
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each 
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or 
death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to 
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an as-
signor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted 
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or 
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's 
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to 
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire 
action and certify the same and transmit all papers therein to the district 
court of the county in which such inferior court is maintained, upon the pay-
ment by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim of 
the fees required for certifying the record on appeal from such court and for 
docketing the same in the district court. The fees herein required to be paid, 
shall be deposited with the clerk of the inferior court at the time of filing such 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so to do, the court 
may, upon motion of the adverse party, after notice, strike such counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim. 
IIL any action so certified to the district court, when any responsive pleading 
is required or permitted or a motion is allowed under these rules, the time in 
which such responsive pleading or motion shall be made shall commence to 
run from the time notice of the filing of the cause in the district court shall be 
served on the party making such responsive pleading or motion. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 13, F.R.C.P. 
The Rules Committee, in the preparation of 
these rules, embodied the following as a note to 
this rule: "Inasmuch as a question may arise as 
to whether a counterclaim or other similar 
pleading is within the jurisdiction of the city or 
justice's court, it was deemed necessary by the 
committee to leave it to the court's discretion 
whether such pleading should be stricken or 
the party filing the same allowed to deposit the 
necessary cost after hearing upon notice." 
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